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Key Tronic v. United States: Te Buck
Stops Here*
ANDREW D. DoRsIo** & JACQUELINE KERRY HEYMAN***
Key Tronic v. United States' represents an attempt by the Su-
preme Court to clarify the previously confused interpretations re-
garding entitlement to attorney fees in private cost recovery actions
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 The Court's decision settled a long-
running conflict between the circuits regarding the proper applica-
tion of the "American rule" to claims for attorney fees incurred as
response costs under CERCLA.3 The "American rule" states as a
general proposition that prevailing parties cannot recover attorney
fees unless specifically authorized by statute.4 The Court drew sev-
* EDITOR's NOTE: The question of whether attorney fees can be awarded under
CERCLA was unanswered when 9:2 of the JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES &
ENVIRON ENTAL LAW went to press. The United States Supreme Court clarified the
issue in Key Tronic v. United States, the subject of this case comment. This comment is
a combination of two separate works that addressed different aspects of this question.
** Staff member, JoUtNA. OF NATURAL REsouRcEs & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.,
Class of 1996, University of Kentucky; B.S.M.E., 1993, West Virginia University.
*** Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.,
Class of 1996, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1992, University of Kentucky.
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 (1988)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. See gen-
erally David R. Bertz & Elizabeth A. Noonan, Supreme Court Challenges Legal Land-
scape of CERCLA Cost Recovery Actions, 8 No. 6 INSIDE LIG. 19 (1994) (concluding
that sections of the Key Tronic decision will result in altering private parties' litigation
strategies, while other sections will stimulate additional litigation).
' See General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d
1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (fees recoverable); Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th
Cir. 1993) (fees recoverable); Juniper Development Group v. Kahn, 993 F.2d 915, 933
(1st Cir. 1993) (litigation fees not recoverable); FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc. 998
F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993) (only non-litigation fees may be recovered).
' Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. 1960 at 1965 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 185-186 (1976)); Cf Sidney M. Wolf, Up In The Air: Recovery Of Attorney Fees
In A CERCLA §107(A)(4)(b) Suit, 69 N.D.L. REV. 275 (1993) (discussing how the
American rule serves as an obstacle to the recovery of attorney fees under the statutory
directives CERCLA); Eric D. Kaplan, Attorney Fee Recovery Pursuant to CERCLA Sec-
J. NAT. REsouRcEs & ENVTL. L.
eral explicit distkctions in recognizing prevailing parties may recov-
er certain legal expenses "closely tied to the actual cleanup."5
The original action developed as a result of Key Tronic Corpo-
ration (a private corporation) incurring substantial cleanup costs,
under CERCLA, as one of several parties responsible for a contami-
nated landfill.6 Key Tronic, the United States Air Force ("United
States"), and other parties disposed of hazardous liquid chemicals at
the Colbert Landfill located in eastern Washington State.' In 1980
the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE) discovered that the
chemicals had contaminated the surrounding water supply Several
lawsuits followed, including a formal proceeding brought against
Key Tronic, the United States, and other parties." After initiation of
the original action, Key Tronic settled a claim filed by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) agreeing to provide $4.2 mil-
lion to the cleanup fund.' ° Ultimately, Key Tronic filed an action
against the United States and other responsible parties to recover a
share of the cleanup costs incurred as a "necessary cost of response"
pursuant to the directives of CERCLA." The asserted costs includ-
ed attorney fees for legal services provided in connection with: (1)
identification of other potentially responsible parties (PRP's); (2) the
preparation and negotiation of the settlement agreement with the
EPA; and, (3) the prosecution of this litigation. 2
The Court initially addressed the succinct issue of whether the
"American rule" is applicable to CERCLA §107.' 3 After determin-
ing the "American rule" applied, 4 the Court examined the elements
tion 107(A)(4)(B), 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 251 (1992) (arguing in favor
of the recovery of attorney fees as consistent with CERCLA and the American rule).
' Key Tronic, 114 S. CL 1960 at 1967.





" Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. 1960 at 1963. Key Tronic sought a contribution claim
for recovery of part of its $4.2 million commitment under CERCLA §113(f), 42 U.S.C.
§9613(f), which was dismissed by the District Court when Key Tronic conceded that the
claim was barred by virtue of CERCLA §122(g)(5). Key Tronic further sought $1.2 mil-
lion for response costs incurred in a cost recovery claim under CERCLA §107(a)(4)(B),
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(B). Id.
" Id. Key Tronic further sought prejudgment interest against the United States
which was awarded by the District Court and not appealed. Additional payments made
by the United States to Key Tronic are not disputed. Id.
" 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
4 Key Tronic, 114 S. CL 1960 at 1965.
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of Key Tronic's claims and distinguished what constituted "neces-
sary costs of response" under §107(a)(4)(B).
In part I this comment explores the circuit decisions leading to
inconsistent conclusions as to whether attorney fees are recoverable
as a "necessary cost of response." Part II provides the relevant back-
ground relied on by the Court in establishing the application of the
"American rule" to §107. Part III deals with the Court's analysis of
the fees generated in prosecuting an action of this nature as "neces-
sary costs of response." Part IV addresses the Court's determination
regarding the component of Key Tronic's claim covering activities
undertaken in identifying other PRPs. Part V focuses on the issue of
fees for legal services performed in connection with negotiations
between Key Tronic and the EPA culminating in a consent decree.
The conclusion centers on matters left open by the Key Tronic deci-
sion as well as the direct and consequential impact the Court's deci-
sion bears on similar cases.
I. PRIOR CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS LEADING To
INCONSISTENCIES
The Supreme Court addressed the continuous judicial inconsis-
tency respecting the recovery of attorney fees as necessary costs of
response pursuant to CERCLA. 5 An examination of the holdings
of various circuits sheds light on the difficulties inherent in the
statutory language of CERCLA, as well as the tension implied by
the American rule and public policy considerations.'6
'" Id. at 1964 ("Other courts addressing this question have differed over the extent
to which attorney's fees are a necessary cost of response under CERCLA." (citations
omitted)).
16 See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation: What are "Necessary Costs of
Response" within meaning of § 107(a)(4)(b) of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 USCS §9607(a)(4)(B)), 113 A.L.R. Fed.
1; Eric D. Kaplan, Attorney Fee Recovery Pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(A)(4)(B), 42
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 251; Laura M. Salava, Attorneys' Fees as Response
Costs Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act; 42 U.S.C. § 9607, (a)(4)(b), 20 J. LEGIS. 87.
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A. Second Circuit Decisions
The court in New York v. SCA Services, Inc.,7 denied the re-
covery of attorney fees under CERCLA,' although an earlier case
allowed such recovery. 9 The court's rationale in SCA Services re-
ferred to Key Tronic,2" holding that if Congress had wanted to in-
clude attorney fees as recoverable expenses, it would have simply
amended §107 with SARA.2'
B. Third Circuit Decisions
Third Circuit courts have adopted differing views of whether
attorney fees incurred in bringing a private cost recovery action
constitute recoverable costs under CERCLA. 2 In Jersey City Rede-
velopment Authority v. PPG Industries, Inc.,' the court affirmed an
award of attorney fees and expert witness expenses, and the third
circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The court did, however,
imply that such items constitute response costs pursuant to
CERCLA.' For example, in T & E Industries, Inc., v. Safety Light
Corp.,' the court held that prevailing parties could not recover fees
for litigation and attorneys unless provided for by contract between
the parties or statute.' Strangely enough, the court recognized
' New York v. SCA Services, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
, "For the reasons set forth below, the Town's motion is denied in its entirety; all
portions of the third, fourth, fifth or seventh counterclaims in which SCA seeks to re-
cover attorney's fees are stricken by the Court sua sponte." Id. at 997.
"' See Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
'0 114 S. Ct 1960 (1994).
"1 Congress included two express provisions for fee awards in the SARA amend-
ments without including a similar provision in either §113, which expressly authorizes
contribution claims, or in §107, which impliedly authorizes private parties to recover
cleanup costs from other PRP's. These omissions strongly suggest a deliberate decision
not to authorize such awards.
Referring to CERCLA §107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
Jersey City Redevelopment Authority v. PPG Industries, Inc., 866 F.2d 1411 (3d
Cir. 1988).
24 42 U.S.C. §9607 (a)(4)(B).
' T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, (D.C.NJ.
1988); See also Michael B. Jones, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under CERCLA: Are
They "Costs of Response" for Private Litigants?, 11 TEMP. ENrT.. L. & TECH. J. 261.
' "This Court recognizes that it is well-established that a party cannot recover at-
torney fees unless provided for by contract or statute . . . Upon careful review of the
CERCLA statute, this Court finds no indication that attorney fees and costs of litigation
are recoverable by a private litigant." Safety Light Corp., at 707 (citation omitted).
[VOL. 10:1
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CERCLA does not intend to distinguish between governmental and
private parties recovering costs." The court rejected the Plaintiffs'
argument,' deciding "enforcement activities related thereto" did
not apply to private parties since "enforcement costs" under
CERCLA implicitly stated the government can recover litigation
expenses.29 Finally, the court simply decided to follow the Ameri-
can rule and refused to create a right to recover attorney fees where
Congress had not explicitly made such an allowance."
C. Sixth Circuit Decisions
Courts in the Sixth Circuit also have adopted conflicting views
as to whether prevailing parties can recover attorney fees. For exam-
ple, in Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,3  the court
concludeded prevailing parties may recover litigation costs under
CERCLA. Qualifying its decision, however, the Court added that
the recovery must stem from a cleanup action, as opposed to a
private right of action for damages only.32
Conversely, in Abbott Laboratories v. Thermo Chem, Inc.,"
the court denied recovery, although it agreed recovery would serve
public policy. 4 The court did not agree, however, that courts could
read recovery of costs into the language of CERCLA.35 Citing the
American rule ,3 the court adopted the common argument that be-
cause other provisions of CERCLA have more explicit language in
awarding attorney fees, 3 such a provision would not necessarily
See infra note 42.
See infra note 54.
29 See Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696 at 707-708.
3 "This Court can find no analogous portion of the statute which would entitle a
private party to recover for legal action taken and refuses to create a right to recovery
of attorney fees where Congress has not expressly stated such to exist." Safety Light
Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696 at 708.
3' Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 27 Envt. Rep. Cas. 1590 (E.D. Ky.
1988).
32 id.
33 Abbott Laboratories v. Thermo Chem, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 135 (W.D. Mich.
1991).
"Although the Court might agree that it would be good public policy to allow
private parties to recover their attorney fees in cost recovery actions, this Court does not
agree that an attorney fees provision for private recovery actions can be read into the
CERCLA statute. Id. at 141.
35 Id.
36 "The American rule is that each party in a lawsuit ordinarily bears its own
attorneys' fees unless there is express statutory authorization to the contrary." Id.
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 9602(b)(1) (the government can recover attorney fees); 42
1994-951
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implicate § 107." Bolstering this conclusion was the argument that
because the amendments to CERCLA did not modify §107, the
requisite explicitness inherent in other provisions was simply not
present.39
D. Eighth Circuit Decisions
Only the Eighth Circuit has adopted consistent views in regard
to the recoverability of attorney fees in a private cost recovery ac-
tion under CERCLA. In General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial
Automation Systems, Inc.,' the court held a private party may re-
cover both attorney fees and expenses incurred in bringing an action
under § 107(a)(4)(B)."1 The defendant argued, pursuant to the gen-
eral American rule, that prevailing parties cannot recover attorney
fees unless expressly provided for by statute, and that under
CERCLA there was no such express provision. The court recog-
nized the American rule, but recognized that attorney fees constitute
"necessary costs"'42 of this type of enforcement activity and that the
statutory language would not yield to such a reading.43 This does
not conflict with the two main purposes of CERCLA: (1) the
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites; and (2) the imposition of
all cleanup costs on the responsible parties. The court recognized
U.S.C. §9659(f) (private citizens can recover attorney fees in private cost recovery ac-
tions).
38
In light of the statutory reference to the government's right to recover
attorney fees and the explicit award of attorney fees to the prevailing party
in citizens' suits, the silence of Congress with respect to recovery of attor-
ney fees in private cost recovery actions is conspicuous ...
This Court will not create a right to recovery of attorney fees where
Congress has not expressly stated such to exist.
Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
" "The rationale . . . is that comprehensive amendments were made to CERCLA
under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)." Id.
0 General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc. 920 F.2d
1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990)("We therefore conclude that CERCLA authorizes, with a suf-
ficient degree of explicitness, the recovery by private parties of attorney fees and expens-
es."); See also Michael B. Jones, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under CERCLA: Are
They "Costs of Response" for Private Litigants?, 11 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 261;
Sidney M. Wolf, Up in the Air: Recovery of Attorney Fees in a CERCLA §107(a)(4)(b)
Suit, 69 N.D.L. REv. 275.
" 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
42 General Electric, 920 F.2d 1415 at 1422.
4 "Attorney fees and expenses necessarily are incurred in this kind of enforcement
activity and it would strain the statutory language to the breaking point to read them out
of the 'necessary costs' that section 9607(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to recover." Id.
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such an interpretation would severely undermine these purposes and
such cleanup actions would be discouraged if a non-polluter was
required to pay for the litigation costs and attorney's fees for a
recovery action, stating, "[t]he litlitigation costs [of a recovery ac-
tion] could easily approach or even exceed the resresponse costs,
thereby serving as a disincentive [for non-polluters] to clean the
site. ' '
Applying General Electric, the court in Gopher Oil Co. v.
Union Oil Co.,45 allowed for recovery of attorney fees associated
with the creation of a fee petition under CERCLA. The court also
allowed for recovery of paralegal fees, including: (1) total disburse-
ments; (2) total expert witness fees; and (3) legal assistant fees.'
The first category included photocopy expenses, printing, binding,
travel expenses, depositions, long distance telephone calls, postage,
LEXIS, publications, exhibits, and miscellaneous expenses (includ-
ing supplies).47
Likewise, in Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,' the court held
litigation expenses constitute response costs under CERCLA. The
court recognized there was a split among the circuits as to the re-
covery of attorney fees, but agreed with the holding in General
Electric, maintaining that decision was the more sound view.49 The
court found that Congress intended §107 to allow private parties to
expend their own funds to cleanup without waiting for responsible
parties to take action, and thus, such parties should recover their
costs."
" Id. at 1422.
4' Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co. 757 F. Supp. 998 (D.C. Minn. 1991).
4' Id. at 1013-14.
4' Id. at 1012.
' Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991)("Thus, to
the extent that any litigation costs incurred by plaintiffs fall within the meaning of the
"necessary costs" authorized under § 9607(a)(4)(B), plaintiffs are entitled to recover such
costs.").
Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710. ("The courts are divided as to whether the response
costs recoverable under § 9607(a)(4)(B) include a private party's litigation expenses ...
The court finds the view expressed by the Eighth Circuit in General Electric to be the
more reasonable interpretation of the statute." (citations omitted)).
o "By providing private parties with a federal cause of action for the recovery of
necessary expenses in the cleanup of hazardous wastes, Congress intended §107 as a
powerful incentive for these parties to expend their own funds initially without waiting
for the responsible persons to take action." Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710 (citations omit-
ted).
1994-95]
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E. Ninth Circuit Decisions
Ninth Circuit cases regarding the recovery of attorney fees also
have expressed conflicting views. The Key Tronic case arose in the
Ninth Circuit,5 where the district court holding was that prevailing
parties could recover their attorney fees.52 Similarly, the court in
Pease & Curren Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc." read CERCLA
liberally and held that Congress intended "enforcement activities"to
include attorney fees and determined that the recovery of such fees
as necessary to induce parties to cleanup on their own initiative. The
court dispensed with an argument that allowing plaintiffs such lever-
age would encourage them to mask a variety of ordinary tort claims,
where successful plaintiffs would not normally recover their attorney
fees, as CERCLA claims in order to recover such fees. 4 The court
concluded that allowing recovery under CERCLA would not permit
a party to expense all of the litigation costs and attorney fees associ-
ated with claims not brought under CERCLA.55
On the other hand, the court in Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corp.
v. United States,56 relying on the American rule, held attorney fees
not recoverable. The court recognized a split of authority on the
issue and the confusion created by the broad language of
CERCLAY First, the court addressed the issue of whether private
parties can incur enforcement costs.5" Second, the court held the
language "enforcement activities related thereto" fell short of an
explicit congressional statement allowing recovery of attorney fees
as required by the American rule." Finally, the court refused to
award fees simply on the ground that it would be good public poli-
cy to allow parties to recover such fees and enhance cleanup ef-
" Key Tronic v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025 (1993).
5 Key Tronic v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 871 (E.D. Wash. 1991) ("The
court finds that a private party may incur enforcement costs, and, therefore, may recover
attorneys' fees for bringing a cost recovery action under §107.").
'3 Pease and Curren Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal.
1990).
-" Id. at 952.
55 Id.
5 Santa Fe Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 687, 695-96 (E.D. Cal.
1991); See also Michael B. Jones, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under CERCLA: Are
They "Costs of Response" for Private Litigants?, 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 261.
5 Santa Fe, 780 F. Supp. at 694-95.
m "First, it is not at all plain from the statutory scheme that private parties can
incur enforcement costs for 'enforcement activities."' Id. at 694.
51 Id. at 695.
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forts.
6 °
F. Tenth Circuit Decisions
In FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 61 the Tenth circuit held
the language of CERCLA did not contain any authorization for the
recovery of attorney fees and costs as necessary costs of re-
sponse. 2 The district court concluded as a matter of law that
the parties were jointly and severally liable and allocated twenty-
five percent of FMC cleanup costs to Aero while denying any award
of attorney fees.3
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the issue of liability and
reversed the portion of the district court's ruling respecting the
recovery of non-litigation related attorney's fees.' The court noted
the circuits remained split on whether the statutory language of
CERCLA contained the explicitness required to authorize the award
of attorney fees associated with the costs of litigation and non-litiga-
tion removal-related activity.' Regardless of its recognition re-
specting CERCLA's design to encourage private parties to engage in
clean-up efforts by permitting the recovery of costs from other
responsible parties, the court declined to interpret the statute to
authorize the recovery of litigation fees as response-related costs.'
Although the awarding of such fees might serve to accomplish the
statutory goal, the court declared, "the efficacy of an exception to
the American rule is a policy decision that must be made by Con-
60 Id. at 696.
" FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993).
62 Id. at 847.
Id. at 845. The district court granted FMC's motion for partial summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability. A bench trial was held on the allocation of response
costs. Id.
FMC Corp. 998 F.2d 842 at 848. Aero's chief executive officer additionally ap-
pealed the trial court conducting a bench trial and contested the apportionment award of
25% of the response costs. The Circuit court affirmed both these issues in holding that
pre-trial order stipulated that trial would be conducted without a jury, and the district
court properly considered the liability of non-parties and other relevant factors in appor-
tioning the costs. Id. at 845, 847.
Id. at 847 (citing Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that litigation fees may be awarded)); General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Au-
tomation Systems, Inc. 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that litigation fees
may be awarded), cert. denied 499 U.S. 937 (1991); Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re
Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 993 F.2d 915. 933 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that litigation fees
are not recoverable); Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1018-19
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that litigation fees are not recoverable).
66 Id.
1994-95]
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gress, not the courts. The desirability of a fee-shifting provision
cannot substitute for the express authorization mandated by the
Supreme Court." Yet, respecting attorney fees associated with
non-litigation response-related costs, the court formulated a contrary
conclusion." Since such fees are not incident to the pursuit of liti-
gation, no legal bar to recovery exists as a matter of law under the
American rule.69 The court required "necessary costs of response"
under §107(a)(4)(B) to " . . . be necessary to the containment and
cleanup of hazardous release."70 The court concluded that a private
party's costs associated with determining a remedy and defending
against a §106(a) action brought by the government cannot be clas-
sified as "necessary costs of response" within the meaning of the
statute.' However, non-litigation costs generated in designing and
implementing the removal action in accordance with a plan sanc-
tioned by the EPA can be encompassed within the statutory
scope.' The principal distinction is that non-litigation attorney fees
can be associated with designing, negotiating, carrying out, and
monitoring the actual removal.73 As such, non-litigation fees in-
curred as a result of similar activities are not barred from recovery
under the American rule. 74
Two cases, with diametrically opposed postures, thus demon-
strate the principal differences in the circuit courts' positions. On
one hand, General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation
Systems, Inc. 5 illustrates the that CERCLA provisions authorize
the award of attorney fees. On the other hand, FMC Corp. exempli-
fies strict adherence to the American rule and denial of such an
award.
67 Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
263-64 (1975)).
68 id.
69 Id, The court refers to the American rule as set forth in Alyeska and Runyon;
see, e.g., Laura M. Salava, Attorney's Fees As Response Costs Under The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; 42 U.S.C. §9607(A)(4)(B), 20
J. LEGIS. 87 (1994)briefly discussing Alyeska and division among the circuits).
" Id. at 848. (quoting United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1448 (10th Cir.
1992) (citation omitted)).
Id. (citing Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436).
72 FMC Corp., 998 1F.2d at 848.
73 id.
74 id.
" General Electric Company v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., 920
F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991).
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II. APPLICATION OF THE "AMERICAN RULE" TO CERCLA §107
As demonstrated by General Electric Co. and FMC Corp.,
CERCLA has a powerful ability to command cleanup activities at
hazardous waste sites. As a result, parties subject to liability under
enforcement actions remain vulnerable to severe financial hard-
ship.76 Specifically, §107 covers the limitations of potential liability
as well as available defenses.7 Recovery of expenditures thus
looms as a paramount concern of aggrieved parties. Key Tronic
appears to have settled the long-running judicial conflict regarding
the appropriate application of the American rule to the recovery of
attorney fees respecting necessary costs of response under §107.
Principally, the Court relied on prior case law in concluding
parties cannot recover attorney fees as cost of litigation "absent
explicit congressional authorization." '  In Runyon v. McCrary,79
the Court noted a few exceptions to the established American rule
forbidding attorney fees, but stated that any such exception could
not be "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States."' Further relying on Runyon, the Court in Key Tronic em-
phasized the necessity for clear statutory language indicating that
"Congress intended to set aside this long standing American rule of
law" and specifically aimed for attorney fees to be recoverable.8
The Court recognized that in some instances the absence of specific
language authorizing the recovery of attorney fees did not serve as
an absolute bar if a genuine intent to provide such recovery could
otherwise be gleaned from the text of the statute. 2 This intent must
76 Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1964; See 42 U.S.C. §§9604, 9606 (1988) (statutory
provision detailing the framework for enforcement actions regarding the clean up of haz-
ardous waste sites).
77 Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1964; See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(b) (1988) (statutory
provisions detailing (a) liability: coverable persons, scope, recoverable costs and damages,
etc.; and, (b) defenses).
7' Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
185 (1976) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
247 (1975). The Court in Alyeska noted that it was not assessing the pros or cons of
the "American Rule;" rather, the Court noted only that this rule "is deeply rooted in our
history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature's prov-
ince by redistributing litigation costs. Id. at 271)).
79 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
'o Id. at 185.
SI Key Tronic, 114 S. CL at 1965 (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at 185-186).
82 Id. (citing General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc.,
920 F.2d 1415, 1421-1422 (8th Cir. 1990)). The Eighth Circuit "concluded that a private
party cost-recovery action is an enforcement activity within the meaning of
1994-95]
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be demonstrated by "a sufficient degree of explicitness""3 rather
than "mere generalized commands." 4 As a general guideline, the
Court was compelled to apply the unrecoverable attorney fees stan-
dard as mandated by the American rule." Upon the determination
of the applicability of the American Rule, the Court examined the
three components of Key Tronic's claims for attorney fees.
m. RECOVERABILITY OF FEES INCURRED FOR PROSECUTING
CERCLA ACTIONS
The Court's analysis of whether Key Tronic's claim for attor-
ney fees, incurred as a result of prosecuting this action against the
United States, was recoverable under CERCLA required a determi-
nation as to whether "enforcement activities" included in
CERCLA's §101(25)6 definition of "response" included private
parties' actions against other PRPs for cleanup costs. 7 With an
affirmative answer, the question became whether such fees were
incorporated as a "necessary cost of response" under
§107(a)(4)(B).ss In other words, the Court created a two-part inqui-
ry: (1) can a private litigant bring an action for recovery of response
costs; and, if so, (2) are the attorney fees incurred with such an
action recoverable? As originally enacted CERCLA made no provi-
sion for a claim of contribution against another PRP. 9 The Court
therefore considered the historical background of CERCLA in light
of the amendments imposed by the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) which gave rise to the term
"enforcement activities. '" The 1986 amendments define "[tihe
[§107(a)(4)(B) and §101(25)], that attorney's fees 'necessarily are incurred in this kind of
enforcement activity,' and that 'it would strain the statutory language to the breaking
point to read them out of the 'necessary costs' that section 9607(a)(4)(B) allows private
parties to recover." Key Tronic, 114 S. CL at 1965. The Court determined that the three
claims asserted by Key Tronic were substantially different from those before the Eight
Circuit.
'3 Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965 (quoting General Electric, 920 F.2d 1415).
U Id. (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186).
85 Id.
- 42 U.S.C.§9601(25) (1988). "The terms 'respond' or 'response' mean remove,
removal, remedy, and remedial action, all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and
'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto." Id.
'7 Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (any other necessary cost of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan).
9 Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
Sld. Prior to the 1986 SARA amendments to CERCLA there was no express pro-
vision authorizing private parties who had sustained cleanup costs to seek contribution
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terms 'respond' or 'response' [to] mean remove, removal, remedy,
and remedial action, all such terms (including the terms 'removal'
and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related there-
to."' The determination hinged on whether attorney fees constitut-
ed a necessary cost of response recoverable under §107 as an en-
forcement activity.' The 1986 amendments provided no direct stat-
utory language governing the recoverability of such fees.93
The Court remained unpersuaded that authorization for the
recovery of attorney fees by a prevailing party could occur absent a
legislative mandate.94 Rather, emphasis was placed on the two
SARA amendments that expressly provided for the award of attor-
ney fees.95 Similarly, the Court addressed the issue of whether judi-
cial decisions, rather than legislative language, permitted private
parties to recover contribution from other PRPs as enforcement
actions under the original version of CERCLA.'
Prior to the 1986 SARA amendments, several district courts
recognized that since § 107 detailed the liabilities and defenses
available to parties against whom the government asserted a claim,
there existed an implied authorization for private parties to assert the
equivalent claim.' The Court determined Congress resolved this
issue by virtue of Congress' endorsement of these decisions evi-
denced by the SARA amendment redefining the term "response" to
integrate associated "enforcement activities. '  The evaluation not-
from other PRPs. The Court noted that there existed two (2) sections of the SARA
amendment that explicitly called for the recovery of attorney fees. (See 42 U.S.C.
§9659(0 (1988) (authorizing private citizens to bring suit to enforce the statute and pro-
viding for the award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party); 42 U.S.
§9606(b)(2)(E) (1988) (providing that persons erroneously order to pay response costs
may under certain circumstances recover attorney fees)). However, no express language
was included in §107(a). Id. at 1965-66.
9' 42 U.S.C. §9601(25) (1988).
' Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1966.
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. §9659(0 (1988) (expressly awarding "reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees" to the prevailing party); 42 U.S.C. §9606(b)(2)(E)(1988) (autho-
rizing persons erroneously ordered to pay response costs to recover counsel fees in some
circumstances).
96 Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
' Id. (citing Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985),
noting that Judge Merritt expressed that "District Courts 'have been virtually unanimous'
in holding that §107(a)(4)(B) creates a private right of action for the recovery of neces-
sary response costs.").
" Id. See also H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pp. 66-67 (1985) (the amendment to
§101(25) respecting the definition of "response action" to be inclusive of related enforce-
ment activities was intended to "confirm the EPA's authority to recover costs for en-
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ed that the 1986 SARA amendment to § 113(f) expressly created a
right for private parties to bring a cause of action for contribution
against other PRPs." Additionally, § 113(f)(1) refers to "civil ac-
tion... under § 107(a). '' l"° Likewise, an amendment to § 107 re-
fers to "amounts recoverable in an action under this section."' '
The Court concluded that an express authorization for an action in
contribution exists under §113, and an implied remedy exists in
§ 107.
2
The Court's disagreement with Key Tronic's contention that an
action under § 107 extended to an enforcement action under the
SARA amendment, thus permitting private litigants to recover attor-
ney fees, culminated in three arguments." 3 First, there exists only
an implied authorization, by virtue of §113, for private parties to
seek recovery of cleanup costs."° The Court relied on prior case
law in determining that it was not at liberty to dispense with a legis-
lative mandate."
Since the approach taken by Congress to this issue has been to
carve out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal courts
cannot award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of [Congressional
authorization], those courts are not free to fashion drastic new
rules with respect to the allowances of attorneys' fees to the pre-
vailing party in federal litigation or to pick and choose among
plaintiffs and statutes under which they sue and to award fees in
some cases but not in others, depending on the court's assessment
of the importance of the public policies involved in particular cas-
es. 106
It is also apparent from our national experience that the encour-
agement of private action to implement public policy has been
viewed as desirable in a variety of circumstances. But the rule fol-
lowed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees has survived. It
is deeply rooted in our history and congressional policy; and it is
not for [the Court] to invade the legislature's province by redis-
tributing litigation costs.... 07
forcement actions taken against responsible parties.").
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1).
'® Id. at 1965-66. See 42 U.S.C. §9613(0(1).
101 Id. See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(D).
'02 Key Tronic, 114 S. CL at 1966.
103 id.
" Id. at 1966-67.
Io d.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975).
'7 Id. at 271.
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Since no explicit statutory language grants authorization, this inter-
pretation lacks the clarity required by the directive of Alyeska, and
is in contravention of the American rule."°a
Second, since Congress expressly provided for recovery of at-
torney fees in two SARA amendments, and failed to provide the
same in either §113,'09 or §107, "' the absence "strongly suggests
a deliberate decision not to authorize such awards."''. The Court
appeared to rely heavily on legislative intent to clarify the applica-
tion of the American rule.
Third, the Court found the term "enforcement activity" not
broad enough to encompass the type (private costs) of recovery
sought by Key Tronic."' The Court further noted, in adherence to
the American rule, that the award of private litigant's attorney fees
connected with an action for the costs of recovery could not be
maintained under the statutory language of § 107."
3
IV. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES FOR PURPOSE OF
DISCOVERING OTHER PRPs
The Court gave further consideration to other attomey-related
costs of litigation regarding the CERCLA provisions. The Court
clarified the distinction between unrecoverable cost of litigation and
costs related to the discovery and identity of other potentially re-
sponsible parties."4 In essence, the Court determined the discovery
of PRPs could encompass work that is immediately related to that
conducted by the lawyer."5 Under the terms of § 107(a)(4)(B), 16
the services required to identify PRPs may well fall into an equiva-
lent category of investigative services required by an engineer,
log Id.
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (expressly authorizing contribution claims).
.I Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (maintaining an implied authorization for
private parties to recover cleanup costs from other PRPs).
I Id. at 1967.
..2 Id. No comment was offered regarding the extent to which the Government
would be permitted to recover attorney fees under §107.
"' Id. Recognition was given to the policy underlying CERCLA in that the primary
design was to "encourage private parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup
by allowing them to seek recovery from others. It may be true that awarding the litiga-
tion fees incurred in that recovery would further this goal. Nonetheless, the efficacy of
an exception to the American rule is a policy decision that must be made by Congress,
not the courts." Id. (citing FMC Corp., 998 F.2d 842, 847).
114 Id.
113 Id.
16 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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chemist, private investigator, and the like. 17 The Court recognized
CERCLA's underlying goal of achieving efficacious cleanup ef-
forts."' The search for other responsible parties "increases the
probability that a cleanup will be effective and get paid for."'9Spe-
cifically, the American rule does not encompass attorney fees that
"are not incurred in pursuing litigation."'' " Thus, Key Tronic's
costs associated with uncovering the United States as another re-
sponsible party served as a necessary cost of response."' Again
this type of activity furthers the overall objectives of CERCLA in
effectively obtaining hazardous site cleanup." The Court pointed
out that certain work performed by a lawyer "closely tied to the
actual cleanup may constitute a necessary cost of response in and of
itself under the terms of § 107(a)(4)(B).' Under this auspice, the
required services were not necessarily "lawyer" related but inclusive
of unlimited professionals, the Court concluded the requisite investi-
gative services may be included within the parameters of the Ameri-
can rule.'24
V. RECOVERY OF LEGAL FEES RESULTING FROM NEGOTIATIONS
WrrH THE EPA
The Court did not extend the same logic regarding the desir-
ability of effectuating cleanup activity to costs incurred as a result
of negotiating with the EPA.' Key Tronic's counsel had prepared
several studies and supervised negotiations that resulted in a consent
decree between Key Tronic and the EPA.'26 In the Court's consid-
eration, the principal purposes for undertaking this activity were to
protect Key Tronic's economic interests as a defendant in the pro-
ceedings and an attempt to limit its potential liability.'27 As such,
.. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967.
"s Id. Compare with note 34 (the same principle relating to effectively encouraging
cleanup was acknowledged but rejected in holding that litigation fees were not recovery
costs associated with response efforts).
I1 ld.
' Id. (quoting FMC Corp., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (1993)).
121 id.
12 id.
'1 Keytronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967.
"2 Id. The Court noted that Alyeska does not govern fees incurred as a result of
investigation "because they are not incurred in pursuing litigation." Id. (citing FMC
Corp., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (1993)).
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the Court held these costs unrecoverable under the directives of
CERCLA, even though the resulting studies inevitably provided use-
ful information and aided the entire cleanup effort. 2 '
This result appears to conflict with the holding in FMC Corp.
As an overall principle, the Court followed the holding handed
down by the Tenth Circuit in FMC Corp. The court in FMC Corp.
determined that prevailing parties could recover attorney fees in-
curred as a cost of negotiating cleanup, as a requisite response
cost. 9 The court classified such costs as appropriately within the
scope of § 107(a) respecting actual response costs not related to liti-
gation expense. The notion underlying this concept remains encour-
agement for private parties to immediately engage in cleanup activi-
ties prior to the identification of responsible parties. Key Tronic, on
the other hand, may leave questions lingering as to the extent to
which the court will permit the recoupment of attorney fees when
generated in conjunction with EPA or other agency negotiations di-
rected toward limiting liability.
CONCLUSION
As a result of Key Tronic, the American rule forbidding an
award of attorney fees absent specific legislative authority prevails.
The principle question remains whether the term "costs" exludes liti-
gation expense but includes expenses of agency adjudication, arbi-
tration, or similar forms of alternative dispute resolution.' 3 The
Key Tronic Court did not specify with absolute clarity exactly what
costs fall within the scope of non-litigation.
Furthermore, private parties maintain only an implied authori-
zation for an action of contribution under § 107, and an express au-
thority for the same under § 113."' This determination gives rise
to severe consequences for private parties commanded by the gov-
ernment to conduct cleanup efforts. The potential expense can easily
i Id.
'29 FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993).
" See McNabb v. Riley, 1994 WL 377723 (8th Cir.). The court utilized a Key
Tronic-type application of Alyeska in denying an award of attorney fees to prevailing
party inaction under the Randolf-Sheppard Vending Stand Act.
"' Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1966 (1994). See also United Technologies Corp.
v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 1994 WL 442398 (1st Cir. (Me.)) (clarifying the rela-
tionship between cost of recovery actions and contribution actions under CERCLA and
noting that Key Tronic observed that §113(f) expressly creates a cause of action permit-
ting a responsible party to seek contribution from other PRPs).
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deplete either personal or business economic resources, and in many
instances precipitate bankruptcy. Private parties may either "pass the
buck" or engage in less effective cleanup efforts at a cheaper cost as
a consequence. Such a result appears contrary to the goals underly-
ing CERCLA, and arises because the Court gives extraordinary
weight to the express language of CERCLA. It remains fairly obvi-
ous that Congress employed less than artful drafting in its construc-
tion. Interpretation of the statutory language should consider the di-
rect statutory purpose rather that the direct statutory language.
After Key Tronic there exists a certainty with which private
parties may now knowingly proceed when confronted with a clean-
up order. Knowledge that costs incurred in attorney fees associated
with litigation expense and negotiation efforts will remain unrecov-
erable may inspire private parties to pay closer attention to property
purchases and waste disposal. Essentially, private parties can pay at-
tention now or pay the attorney later, because the buck stops here.
